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Why do policies often seem to converge across countries at the same time? This question has been
studied extensively in the diﬀusion literature. However, past research has not examined complex choice
environments, especially where there are many alternatives. My paper aims to fill this gap in the
literature. I show how Fine and Gray Competing Risks Event History Analysis can be used to tease
apart the causes of policy convergence. I apply the method to an examination of the reasons why,
from the mid-1990s to 2007, many countries created independent deposit insurers. I find an interaction
between international recommendations and regional peers’ choices, particularly in the European Union.
However, convergence appears to slow under the particular conditions of a banking crisis, regardless of
how well independence was promoted. Possibly due to electoral incentives democracies seem to have
been more likely to create independent insurers. Ultimately, I demonstrate how competing risks analysis
can help enable future research on policy choices, complementing methods previously applied in political
economy.
Keywords: international policy diﬀusion, competing risks analysis, delegation, banking crisis, IMF, deposit
insurance
Why do policies often seem to converge across countries at the same time? Do the circumstances of individ-
ual countries just happen to incline policymakers to make the same choices? Or are countries concurrently
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influenced by common external experiences, such as trade relations, the involvement of international or-
ganisations, and so on? These questions have been addressed empirically many times before on a range of
policies such as pensions (Brooks, 2005), stock exchanges (Weber, Davis and Lounsbury, 2009), bilateral
trade agreements (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons, 2006), and regulatory independence (Gilardi, 2005). All
of these studies have looked at ‘either/or’ policy choices made in isolation. But how can we determine the
reasons for policy convergence when (a) there are multiple policy alternatives to choose from and (b) choices
on diﬀerent, but necessarily related issues are made simultaneously? The case of deposit insurance (DI)
illustrates the diﬃculty of understanding policy convergence: deposit insurers can be run by at least three
types of actors–the ministry of finance (MoF), the central bank (CB), or an independent agency.1
Considering that governance choices were a factor in many countries’ initial decisions to adopt deposit
insurance, how can we determine why countries nonetheless converged on independent governance beginning
in the mid-1990s? This is an especially thorny issue since governance choices were almost always part of
decisions to create deposit insurance for the first time. Such problems have not been addressed empirically
in the political economy literature, especially diﬀusion research, though they plague any attempt to examine
the causes of variations between new policies and institutions. In this paper I aim to push the methodological
boundaries of current policy convergence research by examining DI governance choices.
The current boundaries are defined by the policy diﬀusion literature’s event history analysis (EHA)
“toolkit” (see Brooks, 2005, Elkins, Guzman and Simmons, 2006, Gilardi, 2005, Lee and Strang, 2006, Shipan
and Volden, 2008, Strang and Tuma, 1993, Weber, Davis and Lounsbury, 2009). The toolkit is focused on
single transitions, i.e. why a choice is made or not, and is particularly strong for examining eﬀects in cross-
sectional time-series data (Box-Steﬀensmeier and Jones, 2004). Though successfully applied to many policy
areas, some of which I cited above, it is inadequate when examining decisions that involve more than one
mutually exclusive alternative, such as deposit insurance governance. Governance choices were also attached
to decisions to create insurance in the first place. Given EHA’s limitations, how can we identify the reasons for
choosing a specific governance style from those influencing decisions to create deposit insurance in general?2
Some initial work has tried to tackle situations with multiple choices made in isolation (see Brooks, 2007,
1I treat central bank control as distinct from the other two. It shares characteristics with both independent and MoF
control. Generically, it can be independent from political decision-makers, but also tends to be a well established institution
with significant financial resources like the ministry of finance. I do not examine central bank controlled deposit insurance in
detail. I only treat it as a competing risk (see below). Results from estimation models with central bank governance as the
choice of interest are available from the me upon request.
2Other authors, particularly Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2008), have looked at why countries create explicit deposit
insurance, with any type of governance using Single Transition EHA. In this paper I corroborate many of their findings. They
also examined the reasons that DI was administered “oﬃcially” or privately. Some of their results, crisis for example, don’t
directly match my findings. However, their coding of oﬃcial administration diﬀers significantly from mine.
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Jones and Branton, 2005). In this paper I aim to expand the application of the EHA toolkit by showing
how Fine and Gray (1999) Competing Risks Event History Analysis (FG-CREHA) can be used to examine
complex choice environments. It is already widely used in epidemiology (see Pintilie, 2007, Bakoyannis and
Touloumi, 2011) and is relatively easy to implement.3
In section 1 I show how from the mid-1990s countries converged on independent DI. I use a data set of
174 countries and territories from the 1930s to 2007.4 In section 2 I lay out competing hypotheses for why
countries adopted certain actors to run their first explicit insurers. The first set of hypotheses focuses on
domestic factors and assumes policymakers had fairly solid information about what type of DI governance
would achieve their goals. The second set assumes that decision-makers rely on information provided by
international actors in the form of “best practice” recommendations. Section 3 discusses how FG-CREHA
is preferable for examining these hypotheses. Finally, in section 4 I discuss the results. I find an interaction
between international recommendations and regional peers’ choices that influences a country’s chances of
creating an independent insurer, particularly in the European Union. However, convergence appears to
slow under the particular conditions of a banking crisis, regardless of how well independence was promoted.
Possibly due to electoral incentives democracies seem to have been more likely to create independent insurers.
Ultimately, I demonstrate how competing risks analysis can help enable future research on policy choices,
complementing methods previously applied in political economy.
1 Identifying a Potential Diﬀusion Process
For much of the 20th century deposit insurance as an explicit program was adopted intermittently. The
adoption rate, however, has increased over the past 30 years. In this section I establish the fact that
independent deposit insurance, separate from explicit DI in general, went from being an intermittently
adopted governance type to being the dominant international trend. The finding indicates that diﬀusion
processes may have played a significant role in causing individual countries to choose the same governance
structure around the same time (see Simmons and Elkins, 2004). As such, the finding motivates me to focus
on a diﬀusion approach for understanding DI governance choices.
The United States began one of the first national systems of explicit DI in the early 1930s (Grossman,
1992, 801). The system was operationally independent,5 and from the 1930s to the 1980s it worked fairly
3It can be implemented in Stata 11 or higher with the stcrreg command and R’s timereg package.
4Due to covariate data availability I narrowed the sample to 70 countries observed between 1984 and the end of 2007 in the
final analyses.
5Before the 1980s two organisations–the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Federal Savings and Loan
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Figure 1: Prevalence of Explicit Deposit Insurance Governance Types in 174 Countries (1970-2007)
For a geographical visualisation of these trends over time see: http://christophergandrud.blogspot.com/2011_04_01_archive.html.
The full and constricted (see below) samples of countries and their respective DI governance-type from 1970 used in this paper are
available at: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/12581470/DI_Map/Deposit_Insur_2011%20copy.dta.
well. Though banks failed, no insured deposits were lost and there has never been a repeat of the 1930s
bank runs (Grossman, 1992, 802). Despite this success, by the end of 1979 only 17 countries had DI
(Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali and Laeven, 2005). There was considerable variety in governance among this
group. Two systems were operationally independent (those of the United States and Norway). A number
of the countries, such as Lebanon in 1967 and the Netherlands in 1978, created DI run or controlled by
the central bank. The Dominican Republic created ministry of finance-controlled DI in the early 1980s.
From approximately 1980 until 2008 the prevalence of DI increased considerably, with each governance
style’s relative prevalence remaining proportionally constant. However, from the mid-1990s the proportion
of countries with independent DI began to increase substantially, while the other types’ relative prevalence
remained constant (see Figure 1).6
It is important at this point to make a quick note about data. Between 1980 and the 2008/09 financial
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)–insured deposits. The latter was dismantled in 1989. The organisations were governed by
independent boards comprised of members from both major political parties who were appointed by the President with approval
of the Senate
6Data is based on a sample of program descriptions in 166 countries by Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali and Laeven (2005).
The author coded the programs, expanded the sample to 174 countries, and extended it through 2007 using relevant national
organisations’ websites.
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crisis, once a country established an explicit deposit insurer it tended not to alter the governance structure.7
Jurisdictions transitioned from one form of explicit governance to another only five times (about 6 percent
of all transitions).8 For this reason, I confine my theoretical arguments and empirical investigation to
governance choices for jurisdictions’ initial explicit DI programs in order to achieve empirically meaningful
results. My focus is on variation and convergence in new institutions, and does not include transitions by
existing institutions.
2 Policy Diﬀusion or Not
In this section I present a number of possible explanations for convergence on independent DI, including
non-diﬀusion domestic economic-political causes, as well as diﬀusion-based theories that largely assume
policymakers gather information about the eﬀects of governance choices from non-domestic actors. These
include crisis diﬀusion, regional peer diﬀusion, competition for deposits, and coercion. In the following
sections I test the theories’ empirical validity against each other using FG-CREHA.
2.1 Domestic Causes
The first two theories focus on domestic political economy causes of choosing one type of governance over
the others. They implicitly assume that any multi-country convergence trends are largely coincidental.
2.1.1 Moral Hazard, Democracy, and Delegation
Independence may help deposit insurance systems maintain banking system stability while avoiding a number
of problems–crises, high resolution costs–that can be caused by guaranteeing deposits. Policymakers in
democracies may be more likely to delegate DI, because they have incentives to prevent crises and keep
resolution costs low.
A major cause of banking crises is what Friedman and Schwartz (1963) called the “contagion of fear”.
Individual bank failures can cause depositors at other banks to withdraw their money out of fear that their
bank will also collapse soon. This leads to bank runs, which tend to spread extremely fast and have huge
costs for a county’s economy. Kaufman argues that bank failure contagion–defined as spillover “eﬀects of
shocks from one or more firms to others”–are faster, spread more broadly, and tend to result in larger losses
7With a few exceptions, some detailed below, this remains true to the present.
8For example, Argentina disbanded its central bank controlled system in 1991 in a major banking system overhaul as part
of a transition to democracy. In 1995 it introduced an independently administered system (Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali and
Laeven, 2005, 57).
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in the banking sector as well as the macro-economy than contagion in other industries (1994, 124). Deposit
insurance can prevent this behaviour by separating the probability of deposit loss from bank solvency.
Depositors don’t need to run on their bank if they think it might fail, because their money is safe regardless.
However, this separation creates moral hazard, (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, Grossman, 1992) as depositors
no longer have an incentive to make deposit decisions based on the likelihood of solvency.9 Banks may
therefore increase the riskiness of their lending since they will not lose deposits when they make risky, high
yield loans. Stability is actually undermined.
There are many ways to tailor an explicit DI program to minimise moral hazard while also gaining the
positive public benefits of deposit insurance, including limiting coverage and closely regulating lending risks10
(see Grossman, 1992, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). Governance type may play an important role
in ensuring the eﬀectiveness of these measures by changing how susceptible the insurer is to pressure from
deposit banks.
Banks have an interest in DI with few limits, since this allows them to capture risk premiums without
worrying about losing the deposits needed to make risky loans. They also have an interest in deposit
insurance being directly linked to the public budget, e.g. ministry of finance control, rather than limited
to a fund that they contribute towards. If a bank does fail it will be the public that pays rather than the
banking sector. Put another way, moral hazard can be decreased if deposit guarantee payouts are linked
directly to banks and are separated from the general public budget or even the central bank’s funds. This
creates a separation between bank failure and deposit loss, but not bank failure and banking sector loss due
to risky lending. For deposit insurance to work in the public good, preventing bank runs and moral hazard,
it must be able to credibly maintain long-term limits on risky lending despite private bank pressure to do
otherwise.
A wide body of literature argues that delegated institutions are better able to make these credible
commitments (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977, Thatcher, 2002). A number of International Monetary
Fund (IMF) pieces, among others, argue that deposit insurers should be independent of politicians and the
banking industry to avoid conflicts of interest (Garcia, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000). Political actors and others
with ties to the banking industry could be persuaded by the banking sector in a cronyistic fashion (see Rosas,
2006, Satyanath, 2006) to loosen measures that decrease moral hazard. Independent agencies may be less
vulnerable to such pressure.11
9Though there is some evidence that depositors actually do discipline banks even in the presence of deposit insurance
(Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001).
10Many deposit insurers, such as the FDIC, also have regulatory powers.
11I generally do not make a distinction between independent public and private deposit insurance schemes, which may be a
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Certain factors may incline a government to delegate and separate their DI in order to credibly minimise
public costs at the expense of private gain. Rosas (2009) argues that democracies are more likely to institute
measures that minimise the public costs of banking crises. Democratic politicians cannot rely on just the
support of one group, such as the banking sector, but have to make policy in the interests of a wider
proportion of the population to get re-elected. This leads to the hypothesis:
HDem Democracies are more likely than autocracies to create independent deposit insurers.
How can this theory explain the increase of independent deposit insurers from the mid-1990s? It could be
that the number of democracies simply increased over this period following events such as the collapse of
the Soviet Union.
2.1.2 The MoF and Credibility
There are reasons other than autocracy or crony capitalism that a government may retain direct control over
an explicit deposit insurance program. Deposit guarantees are diﬀerent from other economic policy areas
where authority has been delegated, such as regulation or monetary policy. Insuring deposits in a time of
uncertainty and fear, such as a banking crisis, involves more than simply demonstrating credible limits on
moral hazard. In a crisis, guarantee payouts must be credible to prevent bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig,
1983, Laeven and Valencia, 2008). Depositors need to believe that they will actually get their money back
if a bank fails. Delegated insurers created before a banking crisis may have time to establish reserve funds
that are large enough to reassure depositors. However, if such a fund has not been created by the start
of a crisis, only national fiscal resources appear to be adequate. Credibly signaling the ability to use fiscal
resources would likely require control by the ministry of finance.
There are numerous examples of ministries of finance being turned to in banking crises to reassure
depositors. During its 1997 crisis, the Indonesian Ministry of Finance established a deposit guarantee
financed and controlled directly by the government. This preceded the establishment of an independent
insurer in 2005. From 2006, Hong Kong had an independent deposit insurer, but in 2008 the Financial
Secretary and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority–the MoF and the central bank–introduced guarantees
backed by the Exchange Fund (government reserves) for the full value of deposits, rather than just a portion
of them. Though this was to be administered by the deposit insurer, the decision and the funds to credibly
commit to the new level came from outside.12 Despite having an independent insurer, the government
relevant distinction for this theory.
12From an interview I conducted with Holly Tang of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in March 2010.
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appears to have believed that general fiscal resources were necessary to credibly reassure depositors during
a potentially large banking crisis. In 2008, Sweden went a step further, asserting MoF control over its
previously independent deposit insurer in the belief that credible deposit insurance during a crisis requires
direct control by fiscal actors.13 This leads to the hypothesis that:
HFiscal1 Countries in banking crises are more likely to establish MoF controlled deposit insurance, if they
haven’t already created a scheme by the beginning of the crisis.
A second hypothesis can also be used to test the theory more generally. The problem of establishing credibility
in a new DI scheme is rooted in the potential cost of payouts if banks fail. This problem should be acute
and present even in non-crisis times in countries whose banking sectors are very large relative to their overall
economies. Thus, the second hypothesis:
HFiscal2 Countries whose banking sectors are very large relative to the overall economy are more likely to
govern new deposit insurance programs through the ministry of finance.
The two preceding hypotheses clearly cannot explain the independence trend, but may have instead mediated
it.
2.2 Policy Diﬀusion
The hypotheses thus far have assumed that actors know which governance style is optimal. The following
hypotheses assume that information about optimal governance polices is not fully know to all actors at all
times. Instead, information and the incentives to incorporate it into policy are diﬀused through interactions
between countries and with international actors.14 These processes are particularly plausible for deposit
insurance governance. Given that there are many deposit insurance design variations that may aﬀect financial
system stability and public costs, it is diﬃcult to actually identify what role governance plays. How can
actors identifying which governance style is actually optimal (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, March and Simon,
1993)? To date there is a very ambiguous empirical relationship between DI governance type as described
here and banking crises. No systematic studies have been done on the issue to my knowledge15 and a
13The reason given for this move was that “the [former deposit insurer], like other small authorities, was deemed too vulnerable
in the event compensation had to be paid, and it was determined that its operations should therefore be managed by a larger
authority” (Insättningsgarantin, 2010).
14A number of studies (for example Gilardi and Füglister, 2008, Volden, 2006) have looked at how actors within countries can
learn from sub-national jurisdictions. However, with the exception of the United States, which is not included in the following
analysis, and a hand full of federal countries these processes seem implausible for deposit insurance in this paper’s observation
period given that it was generally a brand new policy.
15The first systematic study of the eﬀects of deposit insurance in general was only conducted in 2002 (Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache, 2002, Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2002). These analyses did conduct a preliminary investigation comparing “oﬃcial”
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summary examination of governance type and banking crises using data from this paper in 70 countries
finds no correlation between the two. Though this is certainly not definitive, it is clear that countries in the
1990s and 2000s probably did not have complete information to suggest a particular DI governance choice
was generally optimal.
Despite an accumulation of empirical evidence that DI delegation minimises moral hazard and prevents
crises, in the mid-1990s and early 2000s prominent international organisations began to strongly recommend
independence as best practice. Beginning in the mid-1990s IMF staﬀ economists, particularly led by senior
staﬀ economist Gillian Garcia, began to recommend that insurers be operationally independent from banks,
political actors, and the central bank as a way of preventing the “pitfalls” of guaranteeing deposits. These
included agency problems and moral hazard (Garcia, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000).16 The recommendation was
adopted into the World Bank/IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program when it began in 1999. Even-
tually, the recommendation would become Principle 5 of the International Association of Deposit Insurers’
(IADI)17 2009 Core Principles for Eﬀective Deposit Insurance Systems. These recommendations are corre-
lated in time with the emergence of independence as the predominant type of governance in the mid-1990s.
What causal mechanisms might explain this relationship?
2.2.1 Regional Peer Diﬀusion
Policymakers may be influenced by their regional peers to adopt a given policy. This process can work
through a variety of specific mechanisms (see Brooks, 2005, 280-281). One could be competition, discussed
below. Another is a learning process where policymakers use the experience of their peers to help identifying
optimal policies (Linos, 2011, Meseguer, 2005, Simmons and Elkins, 2004, Volden, Ting and Carpenter,
2008). Regional peers may provide a useful sample of similar countries’ experiences to learn from. The most
simplistic observation we would expect to make is:
HDRegion1 Countries are more likely to adopt a certain type of deposit insurance governance as the propor-
tion of prior adopters in its region increases.
The hypothesis is fairly neutral in that any governance type could become more likely to be adopted in a
region where more countries adopted it. It is indistinguishable from a pure emulation model (Simmons and
to private management and found a positive relationship between oﬃcial management and the incidence of crises. However,
they did not distinguish between diﬀerent forms of oﬃcial management, particularly MoF and CB. Most other research up to
that point had examined individual country experiences (for example Milhaupt, 1999).
16It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine why this recommendation was made. For research on ideational change
in the IMF, for example, see Chwieroth (2010).
17The IADI was formed in 2002.
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Elkins, 2004) and leaves open the question of why this learning or emulation process would start in the first
place.
Perhaps an interaction between peers and best practice recommendations could explain these issues. The
independence recommendation, may have acted as a frame (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1986) that focused
actors attention, especially since it was made by such prominent policy actors as IMF staﬀ economists, and
drew on the dominant contemporary economic governance paradigm of independence (McNamara, 2002).
However, unlike in the pure emulation model, decision-makers may have been hesitant to adopt independent
DI before seeing how well it applied to their circumstances. Regional peers that adopted the best practice
policy might have provided useful information on how well it worked. Policymakers may have been using an
informal Bayesian process to learn from these two pieces of information. Best practice recommendations serve
as policymakers’ informative priors, which they update with the experience of regional peers. Policymakers
may have electoral or credibility incentives to adopt best practice priors. They can claim that policies were
“vetted” and negative consequences legitimately unforeseen (Linos, 2011, 681). Over short time horizons,
the fact that a growing proportion of peers are adopting a policy without major discernible negative con-
sequences18 may be the best new information they can obtain, further bolstering both their understanding
and legitimacy claims. As more peers adopt a policy, more actors may consider it to be successful. This
leads to the hypothesis that:
HDRegion2 Countries are more likely to adopt a certain type of deposit insurance governance as the propor-
tion of adopters in its region increases and when it is promoted as best practice.
Beyond simple geographical groups, some formal regional organisations, such as the European Union, may
be particularly good samples for decision-makers to draw on. In 1994 the European Union created the
directive on deposit insurance. Though it did not have a governance requirement, Gilardi (2005) has argued
that the EU can push specific ways of implementing a directive either by limiting policy choices or framing
expectations about policy outcomes.
HDEU From 1994 EU members and candidate countries are more likely to adopt independent deposit
insurance.
18This is a reasonable assumption for the time-period examined here since the number of banking crises globally actually fell
substantially from the mid-1990s to 2007 (Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2010, 21).
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2.2.2 Competition
In open capital markets, depositors may choose which bank to place their deposits in based on the qualities of
the jurisdiction where it resides. Countries can compete for depositors through deposit insurance. Depositors
are probably most attracted by countries with high guarantees.19 This possibly explains the existence of
explicit deposit insurance and the level of guarantees, but how might it aﬀect governance choices?
The level of guarantees may not only influence depositors, but also the soundness of the banking system.
Though guarantees are useful if a crisis occurs, it is reasonable to assume that depositors would prefer to
avoid crises in the first place. There are a number of costs incurred by depositors during bank insolvencies,
even if their money is eventually returned. Primarily, this involves the opportunity costs of illiquid deposits
during bank restructuring and, for foreign depositors, the diﬃculty of making an insurance claim in another
country. Therefore, deposits should flow to countries with a low perceived propensity for banking crises.
One way for depositors to determine this probability is to look at the quality of a country’s public financial
institutions. As discussed above, delegated deposit insurance became best practice, i.e. perceived most likely
to promote banking stability, from the mid-1990s. Therefore from this point, countries wishing to retain and
gain deposits in an internationally competitive environment would adopt policies that depositors believed to
prevent crises (see Brooks, 2005, for a general discussion):
HDComp Countries with internationally open deposit banking sectors are more likely to adopt independent
deposit insurance from the mid-1990s.
Clearly if investors had perfect information about the relationship between DI governance and crises, the
relationship between competition and adoption would be constant overtime. The increase in independence
would simply be the result of increasing openness.
2.2.3 Crisis Diﬀusion
Decision-makers may be especially open to recommendations when policies have failed. If a country experi-
ences a systemic banking crisis, the status quo policy has demonstrably failed to achieve economic stability.
Most political actors would be uncertain about how to return to stability. Best practice recommendations
help to overcome uncertainty by suggesting plausible ways to re-achieve economic stability. When such rec-
ommendations appear to be the best alternative, actors’ preferences will converge around them, and they will
be more likely to be adopted (Blyth, 2002, Windmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007). One possible example
19For example, during the 2008/09 crisis many depositors in the United Kingdom shifted their funds to Irish banks after the
government there created unlimited guarantees.
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is the rapid adoption of independent DI in Latin America in the 1990s. As reported by the Inter-American
Development bank, countries (for example, Argentina suﬀering from the tequila crisis) designed their deposit
insurers according to “international best practice” (IDB, 2004, 105), i.e. made them independent. So:
HDCrisis Countries experiencing banking crises will be more likely to create independent deposit insurers
after it has been promoted by as best pratice, i.e. from the mid-1990s.
2.2.4 Coercion
As mentioned earlier, the IMF promoted independent deposit insurance. Did it go beyond general promotion
to force or at least directly influence countries to create independent insurers? The IMF can directly influence
deposit insurance policies with conditions on crisis loans (Vreeland, 2003). In the 1990s deposit insurance
was a regular part of the IMF’s crisis-management advice (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven, 2008, 412).
Conditions about changes to deposit insurance programs in general were often written into loan agreements.
However, in these unstable circumstances, the IMF actually promoted ministry of finance control.
Though many of the relevant documents, such as stand-by agreements, are not widely available,20 some
indicate that the IMF did not promote independent deposit insurance for unstable countries without prior
deposit schemes. Instead, they seem to have supported MoF control during the actual crisis. For example,
Thailand’s 14 August 1997 letter of intent for a stand-by agreement indicates that a guarantee program
should be created through the MoF in order to restore depositor confidence. Thailand created its first DI
program in 1997 and the MoF controlled it. Later, it was made independent. Building on such examples it
is expected that:
HDCoerce Countries that sign IMF stand-by agreements are more likely to create new ministry of finance
controlled deposit insurers.
3 Empirical Model
To test these hypotheses I chose an empirical model that could accommodate a number of issues. These
include (a) covariate values that may vary over time, (b) countries that do not adopt any form of explicit
deposit insurance by the end of the observation period, i.e. right censoring, and uniquely up to this point
in the diﬀusion literature (c) the likelihood of adopting one form of deposit insurance governance given the
existence of three choices and their co-incidence with a common choice. In this section I justify the model
20Electronic publication requires individual country agreement.
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I chose–a Fine & Gray Competing Risks Event History Analysis–as the best able to address these issues. I
also discuss the variables.
3.1 Traditional EHA in Policy Diﬀusion Studies
Many recent studies of policy diﬀusion have utilised EHA to test theories of why policy adoption rates change
over time (see Brooks, 2005, Simmons and Elkins, 2004, Elkins, Guzman and Simmons, 2006, Weber, Davis
and Lounsbury, 2009). In these studies, policy adoption choices are modeled as dichotomous responses. Unit
i can choose to adopt policy k or continue without it. The diﬀusion literature is generally concerned with
convergence at certain periods of time. EHA is used because it directly models time by focusing on the
time it takes before a unit experiences an event,21 such as the adoption of some policy k. This is modeled
primarily through the hazard rate h(t); the instantaneous rate of an event k occurring by time t conditional
on both the event not occurring by time t and the values of a unit i’s covariates. Formally:
h(t|xi) = lim
4t!0
Pr(t  Tk  t +4t |Tk   t ,xi)
4t (1)
where Tk is the time that event k occurs during some time interval [t, t+ t] conditional on the values of a
unit’s covariates xi (Cleves et al., 2004, 7).
It is common in diﬀusion studies to use Cox’s (1972) Proportional Hazards (PH) event history model.
The Cox PH hazard rate for the ith unit is given by:
h(t|xi) = h0(t) exp( 0xi) (2)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard, i.e. the instantaneous rate of a transition at time t when all of the
covariates are zero (Cleves et al., 2004). See Brooks (2005) and Golub (2008) for a further justification of
the Cox PH model in diﬀusion research.
3.2 Competing Risks Models
What this method lacks is an ability to model the multiple choices that actors have and how the existence
of these choices aﬀects decisions. In many cases, only examining transitions to one policy produces biased
estimates (Putter, Fiocco and Geskus, 2007). For example, it would be theoretically inappropriate to treat
countries’ propensities to give control of their deposit insurers to any one institution as independent of their
21For a discussion of situations where events are not observed, i.e. censoring in EHA see Cleves et al. (2004, Ch. 4).
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Figure 2: Competing Risks Model of First Deposit Insurance Scheme Governance Choices
other options. We require an event history model that is able to account for multiple policy alternatives. A
single Cox PH model cannot, and would thus be inadequate to test my competing hypotheses.
Though there are a number of diﬀerent ways to examine multiple choices (see Putter, Fiocco and Geskus,
2007), a competing risks approach is most appropriate for examining deposit insurance governance choices in
the period of interest, as well as new institution variation in general. In theory, none of the governance types
is a priori the final choice. Once a country creates a deposit scheme controlled by the central bank it could
later make it independent or impose MoF control and then reestablish central bank control, etc. Despite
the lack of theoretical justification for these a priori assumptions, data availability significantly influences
the ultimate empirical research design decision. There were only five instances between 1970 and 2007 when
a country changed governance types after insurers had been established. A convenient way to handle this
data limitation is to constrict our research focus on governance decisions for new explicit deposit insurance
schemes. This creates three final states as shown in Figure 2. In such situations, competing risks models
with mutually exclusive non-repeated transitions are the most appropriate type of EHA (Pintilie, 2007).
There are two ways to approach competing risks (a) transition-specific hazards22 and (b) hazards of
the sub-distribution. However, for the purposes of diﬀusion analysis, the transition-specific hazard has the
disadvantage of assuming that the competing risks do not exist (Pintilie, 2007), i.e. that the hazard of one
risk occurring is independent of the others. This paper is more interested in assessing the changing impact
of certain covariates on certain choices given the existence of alternatives. For such situations it is more
appropriate to use the hazard of the sub-distribution. Additionally, transition-specific hazards are not suited
to distinguishing the reasons for creating one type of deposit insurance compared to the others from the
reasons for creating deposit insurance in general. Hazards of the sub-distribution competing risks deal with
this issue in a much more straightforward manner (see Bakoyannis and Touloumi, 2011, for details).
22Cause-specific hazard (for a discussion see Latouche, Beyersmann and Fine, 2007) is the common term from epidemiology.
It is nonetheless an awkward term in the context of this research. “Transition-specific hazard” is more appropriate.
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The hazard of the sub-distribution23 at time t,  k(t), for a transition of interest k is:
 k(t) =
lim
4t!0
Pr(t < T  t +4t , C = k |{T > t or (T  t and C 6= k)})
4t (3)
where T is the time of the observed transition C. If at time t no event is observed, then the observation
is censored. The condition in the braces is one where an event k did not happen until after time t, as in
standard EHA, or there is the possibility that the observations for a unit have ceased because it experienced
a competing transition (Pintilie, 2007, 1363).
Fine and Gray (1999) developed a proportional hazards method, analogous to the Cox PH model, to
estimate the hazard of the sub-distribution  k(t) empirically given by:
 k(t|x) =  k,0(t) exp( |kx) (4)
where  k,0(t) is the baseline sub-hazard. FG-CREHA allows us to analyze independent variables on a policy
choice of interest while accounting for the potential eﬀects of the existence of other choices. Given that we
are interested in governance choices among countries creating their first deposit insurer, we are looking for
eﬀects that diﬀer across the models. Eﬀects having equivalent magnitude, direction, and significance indicate
common factors behind creating explicit deposit insurers in general (Bakoyannis and Touloumi, 2011). These
would therefore be ancillary to this paper’s focus on governance choice.
3.3 Variables
My analyses are designed to find estimated eﬀects that diﬀer across the models for the following variables.
See the Appendix for summary statistics for the analysis period 1984-2007, which I chose because of data
availability. I constricted the sample of 174 countries to 70 countries, as this was the extent of the avail-
able banking crisis data from Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2010). For a full list of the countries in the sample
and their DI governance-types, see http://dl.dropbox.com/u/12581470/DI_Map/Deposit_Insur_2011%
20copy.dta. Separate analyses using imputed data24 over a similar period for the full sample were also
conducted as robustness checks. They produced roughly similar results and are not shown.
Democracy I operationalise democracy with Unified Democracy Scores (UDS) (Pemstein, Meserve and
Melton, 2010). The scores were found through Bayesian latent variable analysis using 10 measures of democ-
23Covariates are omitted for simplicity.
24Created using the R package Amelia II by Honaker, King and Blackwell (2010).
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racy, including Freedom House, Polity, etc.25 I also included a new democracy dummy variable to see if
becoming a democracy had an eﬀect on governance choice. The variable equalled one for the first five years
that a country’s Polity IV score (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009) was greater than 5.
Banking Crisis The second domestic and the crisis diﬀusion hypotheses both make predictions about the
influence of crisis on deposit guarantee governance choices. I used banking crisis data from Reinhart and
Rogoﬀ (2010). Banking crisis is a dummy variable equalling one for every year that a country is in a banking
crisis and zero otherwise.
Financial System Structure The structure of the banking sector may influence what type of governance
is chosen. I examine the importance of deposit banking in general using a ratio of deposit bank’s assets to
GDP from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). To make interpretation easier, I converted it into a percentage.
Alternatively, I measured the importance of big versus small banks using their concentration variable: this is
a country’s three largest banks’ assets as a ratio of total bank assets in a given year. Though concentration
was included in preliminary analyses, I do not show the results here because of a very high number of missing
values that would have considerably constricted the analysis period.
Peers According to the regional peer diﬀusion hypothesis, as more countries in a region adopt a specific
form of deposit insurance governance, non-adopting countries will be more likely to create independent
insurers. I capture this process with regional peer independence and MoF monadic spatial eﬀect variables
(Neumayer and Plümper, 2010).26 For any one country this is simply the percentage of other countries in
their region that have independent or MoF-controlled DI in a given year (adapted from Strang and Tuma,
1993, Brooks, 2005). I use World Bank regional classifications. I used the full 174 country sample to find the
variable values. All regions are represented in the analysis apart from North America, where every country
had an explicit insurer before the observation period began.
I use a European Union dummy variable (EU (from 1994 )) to control for whether or not a country was
or, in the case of candidate countries, wanted to be under the jurisdiction of the EU’s deposit insurance
directive. It equals 1 for every year from 1994 that a country was either an EU member or candidate (as in
Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven, 2008).
25Only posterior means are used in this paper.
26The procedure I used to create the dyadic data sets used to find the spacial eﬀects was from Gilardi and Füglister (2008).
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Competition Though the competition hypothesis is specifically concerned with depositors shifting their
funds into or out of a country, there is unfortunately little data on deposit flows for the full sample. As a
proxy, I use the KAOPEN index of capital account openness (Ito and Chinn, 2008). It measures de jure
openness.
IMF Stand-by I created a dummy variable IMF stand-by equalling one during a year that a country
signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF and the following year. It is zero otherwise. Data is from Dreher
(2006, updated to 2008). It may have been useful to examine the actual texts of these agreements, limiting
the dummy to ones that required a specific governance type. This information is diﬃcult to obtain, as few
countries have allowed their agreements to be made available outside of the IMF’s Washington, DC archive.
Other Potential Factors I included the following variables in the models at some stage because, though
they do not directly relate to one of the hypotheses, they might still be important and worth accounting for.
I included a number of measures of bureaucratic and general country-level governance quality. These are
taken from the International Country Risk Guide (2009). Gross domestic product per capita (GDP/Capita)
in thousands of current US dollars is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World
Bank, 2011). I also considered Central bank governor (CBG) tenure. The variable is from Dreher, Strum
and de Haan (2008, 2010).27
4 Results
Tables 2 and 3 show results from two sets of FG-CREHA models.28 The coeﬃcients—which are interpreted
in a similar way to coeﬃcients in logistic regression—correspond to the primary governance types of inter-
est–MoF and independent. Results from EHA with central bank controlled deposit insurance are not shown.
I treated it as a competing event in both analyses. I include only countries that did not have a deposit insurer
before 1984.29 Since my purpose is to compare reasons for diﬀerent governance choices, estimated similari-
ties and the diﬀerences in sign and significance between these two models are the focus of the discussion. I
summarise them in Table 1.
27Please contact me for information about minor modifications made to these variables.
28The data file and Stata do-file needed to fully replicate this paper’s analyses and estimation tables 2, 3, and 6 as well as time-
varying covariate graphs can be found at http://dl.dropbox.com/u/12581470/code/Replicability_code/DI_Replication/
public_DI_replicible_tables.do. Please note that International Country Risk Indicators are made available for replication
only. They should not be distributed.
29Of the 70 countries in the sample mentioned above 53 were at risk. Nine of these created MoF governance and 20 created
independent governance.
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Before discussing the results it is important to make a few notes about variations that were made as
a result of numerous robustness checks. Ideally, I would have included in the analyses as many factors as
possible that might help explain governance choice. However, as can be seen in Table 5 of the Appendix, many
of the variables are highly correlated with one another. Problems associated with high multi-collinearity
are well known (see Achen, 2002, Schrodt, 2006), especially the tendency to create unreliable coeﬃcient
estimates. I did numerous regressions to determine which variables could be meaningfully included (den Poel
and Larivière, 2004), only a subset of which I show. I used Schoenfeld-like residuals plotted against analysis
time, along with locally-weighted regression-smoothed lines, to diagnose how well the models conformed to
the proportional hazards assumption, i.e. whether covariates are multiplicatively associated with the hazard
(see Fine and Gray, 1999, 503). I added linear time-varying coeﬃcients for variables that violated this
assumption (Golub, 2008, Stata Corp., 2009, 214-215). For these variables the estimated coeﬃcients consist
of both a time-invariant part   and a part  g(t) that varies linearly30 with analysis time. The estimated
coeﬃcient is [  +  g(t)].
Note that because the analysis time was standardised,31 time specific events–e.g. best practice promotion–
common to all units are largely captured in the baseline sub-hazard. The coeﬃcients reported in Tables 2
and 3 are essentially average estimated eﬀects over the analysis time (Hernán, 2010). Ideally, I would have
plotted predicted probabilities of making a governance choice at each point in time to illustrate the interplay
between the baseline sub-hazard and the variables. However, there is currently no straightforward way to
make these plots in Stata or R for FG-CREHA models with time-varying coeﬃcients. Hopefully, future
versions will include this capability to make FG-CREHA easier to use in political economy. A temporary
solution for identifying the impact of time-period specific best practice promotion is to compare FG-CREHA
models with constricted time periods (see below).
4.1 Similarities: Creating Deposit Insurance
My purpose is not to determine why explicit deposit insurance is created in general.32 However, the central
bank governor’s time in oﬃce variable had a similar time-varying eﬀect in both of the models indicating that
it may be part of the process behind both of these two governance choices. In separate models where central
bank DI was the event of interest, it seems to have had no eﬀect. Across the main governance choices of
interest in the mid-1980s central bank governor tenure is predicted to have a positive eﬀect. The longer the
30Other functions were also tested, but did not substantially increase model fit.
31For example, a country that was made independent in 1990 has the same analysis time in 1990 as those that entered earlier.
32For reference, Table 6 in the Appendix shows estimated coeﬃcients for Single Transition Cox Proportional Hazard models
for creating a deposit insurer for the first time of any governance type with the same sample and variables as the present paper.
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Table 1: Summary Comparison of Estimated Covariate Eﬀects.
None -> MoF None -> Ind.
Democracy (UDS) tvc (+ to  )
New Democracy   +
Banking Crisis +
Deposit Bank Assets/GDP tvc (  to +) or +
Peer Region, by type +
Capital Openness (KAOPEN) tvc (  to +)
IMF Stand-by
EU (from 1994)   +
GDP/Capita +
CBG Tenure tvc (+ to  ) tvc (+ to  )
Note: the direction (sign) of the eﬀect is only shown if they were consistently significant at at least the 10% level.
tvc indicates a time-varying coeﬃcient, i.e. switches sign over the course of the analysis. The order of the direction over time is shown
in parentheses.
central bank governor was in oﬃce, the more likely it was that explicit deposit insurance controlled either
by the MoF or a independent entity would be created. However, beginning in the 1990s this reversed. The
longer the tenure, the less likely it was that deposit insurance controlled by one of these entities would be
created. It is initially unclear why this might be and is beyond the scope of my paper.
4.2 Diﬀerences: Governance Choice
Despite this similarity, most significant eﬀects varied between the two models, suggesting that they influenced
governance choice.
Democracy Democracy, as measured by the posterior mean of the Unified Democracy Score, seems to
have had no eﬀect on whether or not a country gave control to the ministry of finance. Its eﬀect on creation
of independent DI went from positive in the early part of the analysis period to weakly negative around the
year 2000. New democracies were less likely to create MoF DI than older democracies and other regimes.
The reverse eﬀect was found for independent deposit insurance, in line with the hypothesis that democracies
are more likely to delegate deposit insurance in an attempt to minimise moral hazard.
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Democracy’s time-varying eﬀect seems to be driven largely by Australia and New Zealand, whose major
banks are subsidiaries of Australian banks. These were the only two countries in the sample with UDS scores
greater than 1.5 after 2002 that had not created some type of explicit DI.33 Unobserved factors may have
influenced their choices not to create explicit DI overall. Once I accounted for the ‘Oceania eﬀect’, it seems
that democracies generally did prefer delegating deposit insurance governance. For example, when I limited
the sample to the years 1984 to 2000, the time-varying coeﬃcient was no longer significant.34
Deposit Bank Assets/GDP The size of the banking sector relative to the economy appears to have had
little impact on whether or not an independent insurer was created. Depending on the set of other covariates
included in the model, the relative size of the deposit banking sector had a slight time-varying eﬀect–almost
negative to no eﬀect in the first few observation years and then positive–or was simply positive, as in the
‘garbage can’ MoF model. This suggests some weak evidence for the hypothesis that, in order for guarantees
to be credible in countries with large banking sectors, decision-makers choose to have them directly linked
to the public budget.
Banking Crises Also in line with the related MoF governance credibility hypothesis, countries experienc-
ing banking crises were more likely to create their first deposit insurer controlled by the ministry of finance.
There appears to be no eﬀect of crisis on delegating control, providing evidence against the idea that actors
in crises reached for best practice governance ideas. The obviously high functional cost of guaranteeing
deposits during a banking crisis may simply make recommendations for independence seem implausible in
these circumstances, no matter how well they are promoted.
33Australia introduced a temporary guarantee program in response to the recent global crisis. New Zealand created a voluntary
program in 2008.
34Hernán (2010) refers to this issue as period-specific selection-bias.
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Peer Diﬀusion Though the results do not provide support for the crisis diﬀusion hypothesis, they do
weakly suggest that regional peers can influence governance choices. First, though EU legislation did not
enforce a specific governance type, (just that explicit DI be created,) being an EU member or candidate
country seems to consistently have had both a positive eﬀect on decisions to delegate governance and a
negative eﬀect on placing control in the MoF. Second, the proportion of regional peers with independent
DI also had a positive eﬀect on delegation choices, even when controlling for EU status. Conversely, the
proportion of peers with MoF-controlled DI does not appear to have had an eﬀect on that governance choice.
I conducted separate analyses within the observation period 1984-1993 with the regional peer and general
EU member/candidate country variables to make sure that the estimated eﬀects were actually related to
the mid-1990s recommendations, rather than a general eﬀect based on some other process. In the pre-1994
analysis, the variables had no eﬀect on governance choices. By examining the time-period specific “biases”
in the sample (Hernán, 2010) rather than just average eﬀects, I find that simple peer learning or some other
time-independent regional eﬀects are insuﬃcient explanations. Regional proximity and organisations appear
to interact with recommendations to influence policy choices.
Competition The capital openness variable had no impact on delegation decisions, and had a time-varying
eﬀect on creating MoF-controlled guarantees. It had a small negative eﬀect until later in the observation
period, when it became positive. This provides some weak evidence against the competition hypothesis, and
suggests that there may be no association between competition and governance choice in general. Note that
these results are not conclusive given the incomplete operationalisation of the variable. Nonetheless, it does
seem that having a more internationally open financial system, i.e. one more prone to international deposit
banking competition, did not impact DI governance choices. This may be because countries simply compete
for deposits on other factors. For example, Switzerland competes on taxation. Iceland before the 2008/09
crisis competed on interest rates.
IMF Coercion Though the IMF may have been important in promoting explicit DI and independence
in general, there is little evidence from these models that it directly coerced countries to adopt a particular
governance style, even the best practice style they promoted. This finding was especially strong when I
included banking crises in the analysis.35 It may have been that IMF stipulations in stand-by agreements
were inconsequential, since MoF-controlled deposit insurance would have been created regardless. This result
does not necessarily indicate that the IMF was not an important force in DI governance trends, just that
35Surprisingly, the two are not very highly correlated in the sample.
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this influence did not work through coercing countries during instability.
Discussion
In this paper I have tried to understand why countries converged on independently governed deposit insurance
over the past 20 years. In order to do this, I have also make an important methodological contribution to
policy diﬀusion studies by demonstrating how FG-CREHA can be used to understand decisions in complex
choice environments.
FG-CREHA has allowed me to identify a number of possible reasons why countries converged on in-
dependent DI between the mid-1990s and at least 2007. I found some evidence that independence in new
insurers was partially diﬀused through a regional peer learning process that interacted with best practice
recommendations. FG-CREHA enabled the identification of a possible positive relationship between regional
peer governance type adoption and best practice independence ideas. The more formalised EU peer group
eﬀect was consistently strong. It is fairly conclusive from this evidence that a simple emulation process
did not drive DI governance adoption practices, otherwise the positive relationships would have been more
consistently observed across the governance types. By pinpointing the time correlation between when inde-
pendence recommendations were made and when peer adoption trends began in all regions besides North
America, I can suggest that recommendations helped initiate the peer learning process. Recommendations
seem to have acted as a catalyst for peer learning. This is also likely part of the explanation for why we
observe countries converging on independent DI from the mid-1990s.
FG-CREHA enabled me to show how domestic functional factors aﬀected convergence patterns. The
increase in the number of democracies in the late 1980s and early 1990s may have helped cause the observed
convergence, since democracies and especially new democracies, appear to be more likely to delegate than
countries with other regime types. This is possibly due to electoral incentives to mitigate public costs,
therefore mitigating moral hazard. These results are slightly puzzling in light of the regional peer findings.
Is it that actors did objectively know that independent DI reduced moral hazard and helped prevent crises
throughout the period? This seems doubtful, given the scarcity of non-ambiguous empirical evidence. The
fact that I found some evidence for both hypotheses should not actually be that surprising. Both are based
on exaggerated and unrealistic assumptions about actors’ beliefs and knowledge. In reality, actors don’t
have perfect information about how deposit insurance governance will achieve electorally conditioned goals.
Equally, they are also not totally ignorant of the eﬀects of governance style in the absence of an IMF
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recommendation or peer evidence.
It is also probably unrealistic to ascribe the democracy findings entirely to Rosas’ domestic functional
concerns. Linos (2011) has shown how democratic electorates themselves can be influenced by recommen-
dations and learn from regional peer and major country examples. This creates incentives for democratic
decision-makers to adopt promoted policies and policies adopted by regional peers and prominent countries,
such as the United State’s independent FDIC.
Crisis seems to have dampened the spread of independence in new insurers. During a banking crisis
the main problem for new insurance programs is demonstrating an ability to actually honour guarantees.
Because honouring guarantees could potentially be very costly, new deposit insurance programs tend to be
more credible if directly backed by the national budget via MoF control. Crises, rather than promoting
the adoption of general best practice ideas, may actually inhibit them when high and immediate contingent
liabilities are apparent. No matter how well delegation is promoted, the sheer cost of a new deposit insurance
scheme makes any new independent program implausible during a crisis. This suggests we need to at least
qualify claims that countries adopt policies for socially diﬀused reasons (see in particular McNamara, 2002)
when high and obvious fiscal costs are involved.
It is important to note a major limitation of my research. Since only about six percent of countries had
changed governance in existing insurers, governance and deposit insurance creation choices are eﬀectively
tied together for empirical purposes. It is currently very diﬃcult to separate out any complex interactions
leading to both governance and insurance creation choices. I am limited to identifying explicitly diﬀerent
results across competing risks models. However, this would be a limitation of any research on variation in
new institutional types. Nonetheless, I have made an important step in expanding our ability to examine
policy choices in complex environments through FG-CREHA. Doing so will enable future researchers to
examine convergence and variations in new policies and other institutions.
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Appendix
Table 4: Deposit Insurance Governance Choice Analysis Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
UDS 0.634 0.912 -1.433 2.036 1680
New Democracy 0.085 0.278 0 1 1680
Crisis Dummy 0.202 0.401 0 1 1680
DB Assets/GDP 60.787 44.696 1.298 270.442 1510
Concentration 0.649 0.207 0.148 1 1148
Regional Peer SE (Ind.) 25.548 22.341 0 100 1680
Regional Peer SE (MoF) 6.335 6.350 0 24.138 1680
KAOPEN 0.454 1.636 -1.831 2.5 1619
IMF Stand-by 0.161 0.368 0 1 1680
Bur. Quality 2.53 1.204 0 4 1600
Socio. Risk 6.173 2.145 0.5 11 1600
EU (from 1994) 0.099 0.299 0 1 1680
GDP/Capita 9.506 12.203 0.19 76.2 1609
CBG Tenure 3.457 3.773 -1 29 1551
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